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We develop a sequential trade model of Iceberg order execution in a limit order book.
The Iceberg-trader has the freedom to expose his trading intentions or (partially) shield
the true order size against other market participants. Order exposure can cause drastic
market reactions (“market impact”) in the end leading to higher transaction costs. On the
other hand the Iceberg trader faces a loss-in-priority when he hides his intentions, as most
electronic limit order books penalize the usage of hidden liquidity. Thus the Iceberg-trader
is faced with the problem to find the right trade-off. Our model provides optimal exposure
strategies for Iceberg traders in limit order book markets. In particular, we provide a range
of analytical statements that are in line with recent empirical findings on the determinants
of trader’s exposure strategies. In this framework, we also study the market impact also
market impact of limit orders. We provide optimal exposure profiles for a range of high-
tech stocks from the US S&P500 and how they scale with the state-of-the-book. We finally
test the Iceberg’s performance against the limit orders and find that Iceberg orders can
significantly enhance trade performance by up to 60%.
JEL classification: C51,C60,C67,D01,D4,D49,G1
Keywords: Hidden Liquidity, Iceberg Orders, Limit Order Book, Market Impact of Limit
Orders, Optimal Exposure, Trading Strategies, Iceberg versus Limit Order, Pre-trade trans-
parency, Agency-Trading.
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1 Introduction
In almost all markets, trade-initiation requires the ex-ante commitment of one party at least,
that is, at least one trader needs to expose his intention to trade. In fact, exposure of trad-
ing intentions lies at the very basis of trading itself. In order-driven markets, for instance,
liquidity suppliers expose limit orders to attract liquidity demanders. In view of the inher-
ent information-leakage that is associated with it, exposure can generate risks as well though.
Copeland and Galai (1983) argue that limit orders give away free options to better-informed
market participants and that limit order-owners face the risk of getting picked-off. Harris (1996,
1997, 2003) explains how the presence of so called parasitic traders can increase trading costs
when exposing limit orders: at the expense of the originator, parasitic traders exploit the op-
tions value out of the standing limit orders, by employing so called quote-matching strategies.1
Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkatamaran (2009) empirically confirm, that order exposure
in limit order book markets can increase, while hiding one’s trading interests can substantially
minimize investors’ transaction costs. Consequently, markets have understood that providing
investors with means to control and mitigate exposure-related risks might attract even more
liquidity to their trading platforms. Therefore, more and more securities markets are providing
hidden liquidity as a strategic trade-tool to investors, either by virtue of “dark” exchanges with
limited/zero pre-trade transparency like Dark Pools or Crossing Networks, or by introducing
hidden or so called Iceberg Orders on traditional exchanges. The latter enables traders to con-
trol information disclosure of their standing orders by hiding the true order size.2 Showing
only a fraction of their overall size, Icebergs automatically slice the order into a sequence of
smaller orders and submit them in a timely succession. Doing this manually, would gener-
ally require a highly sophisticated Order and Execution Management System (OMS/EMS).
Icebergs are thus convenient trade tools, particularly for less sophisticated large traders that
frequently/occasionally face substantial exposure-risk.
A growing body of empirical studies indicate the wide-spread use of hidden orders. For instance,
Pascual Gasco and Veredas (2008) report that 26% of all trades on the Spanish Stock Exchanges
involve hidden volume. Frey and Sandas (2009) report that 9.3% of submitted and 15.9% of
executed shares contain Iceberg orders on the German Xetra Stock Exchange. De Winne and
D’Hondt (2004; 2007; 2009) report that 27.2% (20.4) of the total liquidity in the book is hidden
for the French CAC40 (Belgian BEL20) exchanges and moreover that the hidden ratios can
even reach 50% at the best limit prices. Tuttle (2003) finds that around 25% of liquidity for all
NASDAQ National Market quotes are hidden. Further studies confirm that hidden liquidity is
particularly prevalent among large investors: D’Hondt et al. (2004) report that 81% of orders
with total sizes in the largest quartile are Icebergs or (partly) hidden orders. Supplementing
this findings, Frey and Sandas (2009) find that Iceberg orders are on average 12-20 times larger
than limit orders. Despite the many benefits for liquidity-providing investors, markets need to
balance investors’ demand for hidden liquidity with their natural desire to trade at transparent
1Consistent with this reasoning Aitken et al. (2001) and Bessembinder et al. (2009) report that hidden orders
are used to reduce the options value. The findings of Harris (1996) and De Winne and D’Hondt (2009) suggest
that traders are willing to expose more when the minimum tick size is large, i.e. when the risk of getting
front-run is low.
2In this sense, Iceberg is an allusion to the arctic Iceberg, where only a fraction, namely its top, is openly
displayed.
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(“fair”) prices and in particular to understand the price formation process. Therefore, markets
put limits on pre-trade opacity; the majority of todays electronic exchanges give visible liquidity
higher priority-in-execution over hidden liquidity.3 The beneficial reduction in exposure-risk
comes at the cost of a loss in execution-priority, i.e. an increased execution risk. Traders
thus need to the balance these two antagonistic sources of risk. This paper proposes a simple
microstructure model for analyzing optimal display sizes that yields many empirically testable
hypotheses.
1.1 Literature Review
Although the theoretic literature on limit order book models is rather rich, see Foucault, Kadan,
and Kandel (2005), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005) or Rosu (2009) among many others,4
“hidden” aspects have so far received relatively little attention in the more theoretical literature.
Moinas (2010) and Buti and Rindi (2008) employ game-theoretic frameworks with informed
agents, obtaining (stationary) equilibrium exposure strategies. Moinas introduces a sequential
trade model where the display of a large limit order may cause other impatient traders to retreat
from the market.5 As a consequence, the limit order trader is faced with lower execution
probability. Therefore, he uses hidden liquidity to obscure his intentions. Buti and Rindi
extend the literature on dynamic limit order markets by allowing strategic traders the freedom
to use (partially) hidden orders. They find that hidden orders are used to prevent traders
from liquidity competition. In line with the regulator’s perspective, their simplified, agent-
based approach allows them to address questions optimal market design and regulation, and
to study different dimensions of market quality with respect to hidden orders. In both models
- in order to solve for the equilibrium strategies and to reproduce the desired salient features
- the set-up is necessarily limited and stylized.6 In addition, the introduction of concepts like
“information” or “utility-preferences” makes it generally hard to quantify and reconcile the
models with available market data, precluding any practical applications from the investor’s
point-of-view.
The literature on optimal liquidation, pioneered by the work of Bertsimas and Lo (1998) and
Almgren and Chriss (1999) and recently extended by many authors including Almgren and
Chriss (1999); Almgren (2003, 2001); Obizhaeva and Wang (2005); Alfonsi, Fruth, and Schied
(2010) follows a more qualitative approach to modeling trading and liquidation problems in
illiquid markets. Almgren and Chriss explains the need for this line of research: “[The game-
theoretic ansatz] is helpful when we are interested in certain properties of the book, but quite
restrictive when analyzing the optimal trading strategy”. In the spirit of the Almgren-Chris-
approach Esser and Mönch (2007) consider a single-agent framework with a risk-neutral liquidity
3More precisely, the majority of todays electronic stock exchanges enforce price priority first. Display-priority
is enforced at second stage.
4See also Glosten (1994); Seppi (1997); Parlour (1998); Foucault (1999); Parlour and Seppi (2003). Parlour
and Seppi (2008) provides an extensive survey on Limit Order Book models.
5In this framework, impatient traders are in effect market order traders.
6For instance, in Moinas (2010) order sizes and depths can only take three values. Buti and Rindi (2008) on
the other hand, assume that large traders trade a fixed-size position, while small traders trade at smaller sizes
than large trader’s display size.
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trader7, who arrives pre-committed to trade and has a non-informational (“exogenous”) trade
motive. The trader is not concerned with informational aspects and is thus blind towards
adverse selection risks. Moreover, they assume that the trader determines his trading strategy
with a view at reducing his transaction costs only. In spite of considering the action of every
single agent simultaneously, the focus on the single agent’s optimal trade strategy allows to
aggregate the rest agent population’s actions, by using aggregated order flow and price dynamics.
Typically, the emerging aggregated processes are deemed exogenous.8 Under stylized market
assumptions, Esser and Mönch obtain trader’s optimal (static) Iceberg-strategy.
1.2 Our Contributions
Our work contributes to literature on optimal order placement in limit order books. Specifically,
we consider a liquidity trader, with a fixed trading horizon using an Iceberg order. We assume
that the trader has a prespecified reference or benchmark price and the additional freedom to
hide a portion of the order. Order execution is governed by order arrivals and cancelations. In
order to keep the analysis tractable and transparent we do not model individual order arrivals
but rather introduce aggregate limit and market order flow volumes and cancelation ratios,
that add and retract liquidity on the trader’s side of the market. The random flows determine
the execution volume at terminal time; assuming a liquidation constraint, at the end of the
trading period unexecuted orders are executed against the best prevailing opposite price. The
price process is modeled as a separate (independent) stochastic process. The trader’s goal is to
determine the optimal exposure (display size) so as to minimize his transaction costs.
In our setting, there are three main sources of risk that determine transaction costs. The first
two are related to execution risk: market order traders refraining from entering the market, and
increased liquidity competition at (or ahead) the submission price level.9 While both scenarios
of execution-risk are embedded into our model, the equilibrium-models of Moinas (2010) and
Buti and Rindi (2008) only report evidence for at most one scenario. According to Moinas
(2010) impatient traders may refrain from trading (reduced market order flow) thus increasing
execution risk; according to Buti and Rindi (2008) execution risk may increase due to higher
liquidity competition (increase in limit order flow). The third source of risk is introduced by
the liquidation constraint, i.e., the uncertainty about the price at the end of the trading period.
Our framework therefore enables us to study the effect of the execution risk, which is governed
by the order flow, and adverse price movements on the optimal display decision simultaneously.
The assumption that the trader’s exposure decision impacts the market dynamics, especially
order flows, is central to our model and the modeling of exposure impact. Since the Iceberg’s
exposure changes the visible state of the order book, in particular the quoted book-imbalance10,
we assume that changes in the visible state of the order book influence the dynamics of the
market. The fact that the state of the order book carries information about future market
movements and that much of the explanatory power can be captured by the best quoted depth
7Foucault et al. (2005) use the liquidity trader-approach in a recent limit order book model.
8Instead of providing an additional equilibrium argument as done by Moinas (2010) and Buti and Rindi
(2008), the market is taken as given. For limit order book modeling, several other studies use the exogenous-
order-flow-ansatz; See Angel (1994); Domowitz and Wang (1994); Harris (1998).
9By introducing the parasitic trader Harris (1996) provides economical reasoning for the latter scenario.
10Book-imbalance is to be understood as the ratio between visibly quoted bid-side versus sell-side liquidity
4
imbalance has been extensively documented in the empirical literature; see, e.g., Bessembinder
et al. (2009); Biais et al. (1995); Ranaldo (2004); Griffiths et al. (2000); Cao et al. (2009); Huang
and Stoll (1994); Beber and Caglio (2005); Pascual Gasco and Veredas (2008); Chordia et al.
(2002). We therefore model the exposure impact of our limit (Iceberg) order through its impact
on the order book’s imbalance.
Our work is also aimed at verifying recent findings on the determinants of exposure decisions by
Bessembinder et al. (2009). Confirming their empirical findings, in our model the trader hides
more when the order is large, depths at the top of the book is small, the imbalance-excess is on
the opposite side of the book, liquidity consumption rates are high and/or liquidity competition
is low. We also find that when the market’s sensitivity towards the imbalance of the order book
is sufficiently weak, the optimal display strategy is to expose the whole order. This is due to
the fact, that in this case, exposure leads only to minor (possible) adverse market reactions,
while at the same time the trader benefits to the full extent from the gain in time priority
when exposing liquidity. Moreover, Bessembinder et al. report that exposure is associated with
shorter time-to-completion, but at the same time with larger shortfall costs. We show that this
is true for markets where prices drift away from the side of excess-imbalance. Due to the fact
that he systematically under-estimates the opportunity cost, the volume-trader over-exposes his
trading intentions to the market. We show, that there might be situations, where the opposite is
true. However, our empirical observations strongly indicate, that in “realistic” markets, prices
indeed drift away from the side of excess-imbalance. Our framework allows to quantify the
dualism between execution risk and exposure risk. We show analytically, that the execution
performance can be separated into two parts, an exposure-rewarding contribution that stems
from the priority-gain and a market impact contribution that comes from the market’s reaction
towards changes in the quoted imbalance.
Using high-frequency INET-order-message and NASDAQ quote data, we estimate the exposure
impact of displayed orders, by measuring how changes in the book-imbalance affect the different
components of the market: liquidity provision and liquidity consumption flow as well as the
future price level. Cross-sectionally, we find that with greater exposure, prices in general move
away and liquidity competition (consumption) on the same side increases (decreases). Since
the imbalance is a function of the displayed order size, our results add to the research on
market impact of limit orders.11 In contrast to earlier research, by virtue of model-design, we
explicitly capture the impact on flows instead of prices alone. Furthermore, our market impact
estimates enable us to provide optimal display profiles for a range of high-tech stocks from the
S&P 500. Particularly, we show how the optimal exposure strategy depends and scales with
the state of the order book. We observe generic patterns in the optimal exposure strategies
among different stocks but also report stock-specific peculiarities. Finally, we benchmark the
Iceberg performance against plain limit order. Naturally, the Iceberg order always performs
better than the limit order. We find that the use of Iceberg orders, instead of plain limit orders,
can substantially increase the execution performance. We report performance enhancement of
up to 60 %. These performance gains are particularly relevant for large orders and when the
(initial) book-imbalance is skewed towards the same-side of the trade.
11While the impact of market orders has been extensively investigated in the optimal liquidation literature,
much less effort has been devoted to the impact of limit (passive) orders. In a recent empirical work, Hautsch




The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the our
model, including the order flow and price dynamics and calculate the respective objective
function. In Section 3, we estimate the model (market impact) parameters. We make statements
about different types of market impact, presence of parasitic traders, scare-away scenario and
price-retreat. In Section 4 we use the parameter estimates to calculate the Iceberg’s expected
execution price for a class of order and market parameters. Furthermore, as the display size
is a free parameter of the model, we are able to provide the optimal size and illustrate how
the optimal display strategy scales with certain order and market parameters. Moreover, we
benchmark the Iceberg performance against the case of plain limit orders. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an Iceberg Order trader (“she”), who trades for liquidity reasons. Specifically,
the trader aims to buy a (large) position of N shares over a (short) trading period [0, T ]. Her
reference price is the prevailing best bid price (B0) at which we assume she submits an Iceberg
Order. 12 The trader can choose to openly display any number ∆ ∈ [0, N ] of shares in the
order book. The remaining N − ∆ shares are shielded from public view and remain hidden
until execution or cancelation. A random number V ∆T of shares is executed before the end of
the trading period. In order to enforce full liquidation at the end of the trading period, the
unexecuted part N − V ∆T of the order is canceled at the terminal time T and executed against
standing sell limit orders at the then prevailing best ask price A∆T
13. The dependence of the
execution volume V ∆T and best ask price A
∆
T on the display size ∆ accounts for the possible
impact visible orders have on the dynamics of the order book.
Remark 1. “Price aggressiveness” has been identified as a determinant of optimal display
sizes in Bessembinder et al. (2009). Submitting the order at the top of the book means that
aggressiveness is a not a decision variable in our model. Nevertheless, we can solve the execution
problem for every single price level and than compute the optimal price level. However, this
would essentially convolute our problem, without yielding further substantial insights on our
central focus, namely analyzing the question of optimal exposure. This is typically a second-
stage problem, once a price level has been chosen.
The absolute transaction costs are given by
P̃∆ := V ∆T B0 +
(
N − V ∆T
)
A∆T .
To facilitate performance comparisons across assets, we consider relative transaction costs and
chose the relative execution price as our performance measure. We define the relative execution
12In Implementation shortfall-execution strategies, this is a fairly common set-up within the Agency Execu-
tion-business. The trader fixes a so-called reference or decision-price. In most cases, the best quoted prices
that are available at the time of submission - i.e. either best bid or ask price - are taken to be the decision price
(also frequently referred to as the “arrival price”). For further details see Johnson (2010) and Domowitz and
Yegerman (2005).
13For simplicity, we assume that market orders incur no transaction costs. The impact of market orders has
already been extensively studied in the recent literature. See Almgren and Chriss (1999); Alfonsi et al. (2010);
Alfonsi and Schied (2010); Obizhaeva and Wang (2005).
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price P∆ as the difference between the average trade price per share and the time-of-trade









































represents the relative difference between the benchmark and submission price B0 and
the realized price A∆T of the unexecuted part (“effective spread”). It measures the opportunity
cost that is associated with delayed execution on a per share basis.
For short time periods it is reasonable to model the two sides of the order book, the bid and the
ask side, as being independent.14 We therefore assume that the random variables V ∆T and A
∆
T
are conditionally independent given ∆.15 Then, we can write the expected relative execution
price as











































where µ(∆) := E[S∆T ] denotes the expected effective spread at the terminal time. To shorten
notation, we might occasionally write µ instead of µ(∆); by construction, E[V ∆T |∆] = E[V
∆
T ]
and E[S∆T |∆] = E[S
∆




T are conditional on ∆. The trader’s objective is now
to find the optimal display size ∆∗.
Definition 1. The optimal display size ∆∗ is defined as
∆∗ = argmin
0≤∆≤N
{W (∆)} . (2.3)
In order to guarantee that an optimal display size exists it is enough to assume some form of
continuity of the dependence of the distribution of the total execution volume and ask price on
the displayed part of the Iceberg order.
14Over short periods of time the two sides of the book are not tightly following each other as evidenced by
the ubiquitous “widening” and “narrowing” of spreads. In the mid- and long run though, the two sides of the
market will essentially co-move.




refer to opposite sides of the book. V ∆
T
denotes the execution volume
on the traders (buy) side of the book, while A∆
T
denotes the best price on the opposite (ask) side.
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2.1 Order Arrival Dynamics and Iceberg Execution Volume
The executed iceberg order volume is determined by the incoming order flow. Sell market orders
execute against standing buy limit orders and improve the chance of execution while incoming
buy limit orders add liquidity to the same side of the book and hence impede the chance of
execution.
Modeling the full dynamics of individual order arrivals and cancelations would render the analy-
sis of our model too complex. To enhance tractability, we use a reduced-form model of aggregate
order flow. Specifically, order flows are aggregated into single submissions, effectively reducing
our model to a 2-stage model: first (aggregate) limit orders arrive (or cancel); subsequently
(aggregate) market orders arrive. Orders arrive according to a probabilistic dynamics that is
independent of the stock price process; the aggregate market order volume arriving during the
period [0, T ] is denoted x ≥ 0 while the aggregate limit order volume at the submission and
more competitive price levels is denoted y ≥ 0 and ŷ ≥ 0, respectively.
Execution of standing limit orders by market orders is settled according to a set of priority
or precedence rules. Almost all electronic trading venues give priority to orders submitted at
more competitive prices and displayed orders have priority over hidden orders at the same price
level. Orders with the same display status and submission price are usually served on a first-




The precedence rule identifies aggregate order flows, standing visible volume at the submission
price level (denoted D), the cancelation ratio (C) of the standing orders at the top, and the
hidden liquidity at the submission price level (denoted h) as the determinants of the Iceberg
execution volume.
At the time of submission the standing visible volume D has priority over the Iceberg Order;
the displayed part ∆ has priority over the standing hidden volume (h). On the other hand, by
virtue of the time-priority rule, the hidden volume (h) has priority over the Icebergs hidden
part (N−∆). Thus, after the limit orders have arrived the order volume with higher execution
priority than the displayed Iceberg part is
Qd := D(1− C) + ŷ.
The total order volume with priority over the hidden part is
Qh := Qd +∆+ h+ y.
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Thus, the sequence of execution priority reads (Qd,h+y,N−∆) with the first entry representing





0 x ≤ Qd
x−Qd Qd < x ≤ ∆ +Qd
∆ ∆ +Qd < x ≤ Qh
∆ + x−Qh Qh < x ≤ Qh +N −∆
∆ + (N −∆) Qh +N −∆ < x.
(2.4)
Remark 2 (Order Aggregation and lower Execution Bound). If we were to assume more
general stochastic processes for the limit and market order arrivals using, for instance, poisson-
arrival times nx(t) and nŷ(t) and random order sizes (xi)i≥0 and (ŷj)j≥0, then a limit order’s





























where we have assume for simplicity that cancelations take place at end of trade-period. Hence,
our model systematically under-estimates the “true” execution volume so order-aggregation
yields a lower bound for order execution in limit order books. The conclusions for Iceberg
Orders can be drawn in an analog way.
The execution volume V ∆T is given in terms of the observable quantitiesD , ∆, N, the cancelation
ratio C and the random (unobservable) quantities h, y, ŷ, and x. Unobservable quantities are
modeled as non-negative random variables.16 In specifying their distributions we account for
the important empirical observation that over shorter time periods order flows (market and
limit) may be zero; see Table 3 in the appendix for selected estimates. The amount of standing
hidden liquidity may also be zero.
In order to keep the model parameters to a minimum it is convenient to specify the distributions
of random variables in terms of the probabilities of the variables taking the value zero and the
conditional mean given they are positive. We therefore assume that the density functions of
the flow variables x, y, ŷ and the hidden liquidity variable h take the form
16We denote random variables by lower case letters and deterministic quantities by capital letters.
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β · 1{s>0} (2.6)






β̂ · 1{t>0} (2.7)





α · 1{u>0} (2.8)






γ · 1{v>0} , (2.9)
where 1 is the indicator function. The advantage is that with our choice of density functions
the expected transaction volume can be given in closed form. This renders our model amenable
at to some theoretical analysis. The proof of the following proposition is given in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (Expected Execution Volume). If p · α,N > 0, then






























In particular, the expected execution volume is bounded by the expected amount of arriving
market order volume:








< p · α. (2.12)
The first term in the curly brackets in (2.10) corresponds to the execution of the hidden part
of the Iceberg Order. It depends on the parameters characterizing submission-level liquidity
(γ,β) relative to the market order volume (α), the total order size N, and the display ratio
relative to the expected market order volume. The terms (1− βr) and (1− γr) reflect the loss
in time-priority the hidden part suffers due to incoming visible and standing hidden orders at
the submission price level, respectively. The quantity (1 − e−
∆
α ) corresponds to the execution
of the visible part; it only depends on ∆.
The benchmark case ∆ = N captures the limit order case where only the second term matters.
For Iceberg Orders both terms, the “displayed” and the “hidden” execution volume determine
the overall (expected) execution volume. In what follows, we will always implicitly assume that
α ·p,N > 0 holds. Otherwise, the Icebergs expected execution volume would be trivial, namely
zero.
Remark 3. As we can express the (expected) execution volume in terms of the ratios β̂r, βr
and γr, the flows that interfere with the Iceberg’s execution enter the problem only relative to
the market order flow α.
In order to understand how the exposure ∆ affects the trader’s execution performance, it
is necessary to understand how the execution performance changes with changes of market
parameters. The follows result is easily checked.
10
















2.2 Market Impact of Exposure and the Book-Imbalance
It has been empirically verified by many authors that the (visible) state of the order book
carries information about future market dynamics.17 In particular, Harris (1996, 2003) argues,
that openly displayed limit orders pose a free option to other rogue or parasitic traders and
that exposure may encourage “front-running” practices. In accordance with these empirical
findings, we assume that, since they change the state of the open order book, openly displayed
limit orders affect the market’s future behavior, a fact we refer to as market impact of exposure
or simply exposure impact.
The way we model exposure impact is that the model parameters depend on the traders exposure
choice (display size) ∆. More precisely, our idea is to capture the impact of the display size
∆ through its impact on the top-of-the-book imbalance. The underlying assumption is that
volume imbalance at the first price level is an indicator of future market movements, especially
with respect to order flows and best ask prices.18 We define the relative initial imbalance as
I0 :=
D bid −D ask
D bid +D ask
,
where Dbid and D ask denote the initial (visible) standing volume at the best bid and ask,
respectively. Positive values represent bid-side liquidity excess, while negative represent sell-
side excess. The imbalance as a function of the display size ∆ is then given by
I(∆) =
D bid −D ask +∆








denotes the display ratio and Nr :=
N
D ask+D bid
is the volume ratio, i.e, the
percentage of volume a fully displayed Iceberg order would add to the book. Thus, the impact
of the display size on the imbalance is felt trough the proportion of visible orders added to the
top of the book.
Market Impact of order exposure is now realized by allowing the free model parameters, the
(conditional) probabilities p, q̂, q, r and conditional means α, β, β̂, γ as well as µ, to depend on
the imbalance I(∆). To denote this dependency we may henceforth write α(I) or αI and in the
same fashion for the other parameters. The trader’s expected execution price (2.2) can thus be
17For instance, see Biais et al. (1995); Huang and Stoll (1994); Cao et al. (2009); Chordia et al. (2002); Beber
and Caglio (2005); Ellul et al. (2003); Harris and Panchapagesan (2005); Ranaldo (2004); Griffiths et al. (2000).
18Findings in Hellström and Simonsen (2006); Pascual Gasco and Veredas (2008); Cao et al. (2009); Chordia
et al. (2002); Huang and Stoll (1994) suggest that the order book imbalance I captures most of the explanatory
power of the order book state. Cao et al. (2009) Cao et al. (2009), Simonsen et al. (2003) Hellström and
Simonsen (2006) and Pascual et al. (2004) Pascual Gasco and Veredas (2008) report that most of the imbalance’s
explanatory power concentrates on the best quotes.
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expressed as



















We notice that the expected execution price depends directly on the display size through a loss
in time priority (priority impact) and indirectly though its impact on imbalances and hence
flow parameters (exposure impact).
2.3 Analytical Discussion
Taking the total derivative of W , changes in the expected execution price due to infinitesimal


































Since the cumulative market order flow volume (α) enters the definition of W explicitly and
implicitly through its impact on β̂r and βr we take the total instead of partial derivative with
respect to α. Of course, the optimal display size ∆∗ satisfies
∆∗ =
{
N if MMarket(∆) < MPriority(∆)
0 if MMarket(∆) > MPriority(∆)
for all ∆ ∈ [0, N ]. (2.17)
Moreover, if the mapping ∆ → W (∆) is strictly convex and ∆∗ ∈ (0, N) then the optimal





Closed-form solutions for the optimal display size will not be available in general, due to the
highly non-linear dependence of the model parameters on the display size. We shall therefore
confine our theoretical analysis to asymptotic and monotonicity considerations and identify
situations where one of the conditions in (2.17) is satisfied.
2.3.1 Absence of market impact
As the priority-rules favor visible over hidden liquidity one expects the priority-term (MPriority)
to systematically reduce transaction costs, so its contribution to the total differential should
be negative; Lemma 1 confirms this assertion. Matters are less clear cut for the market impact
term (MMarket). Depending on how the market reacts to changes in the imbalance/exposure,
the term may either penalize or reward exposure. We first identify a situation where markets
reward exposure full display is optimal.
Corollary 1. Assume that, on average, liquidity demand increases and liquidity supply de-
creases with larger book-imbalance and assume that the price (on average) moves in the direction
12









∆∗ = N (2.18)

















≤ 0, the market-impact-term (MMarket) in (2.16)
is negative. Since the priority term (MPriority) is negative, the total derivative in (2.16) is
negative and hence ∆∗ = N.
In the preceding case, exposing the full order allows the trader to benefit from the gain in
time-priority to the full extent.19 As we shall see below, though, in most cases the market
impact term (MMarket) - instead of rewarding - penalizes order exposure.
20 This suggests that
time-priority-gain and exposure-impact are counter-acting mechanisms. Hence, at this point
we anticipate that there will be some trade-off between these two impact-contributions that
determines the optimal display size.
2.3.2 Asymptotics
We are now going to identify (limiting) situations where full, respectively no display is optimal.
As it turns out, the results strongly depend on how prices react to changes in imbalances. We



















The following proposition states that in markets where prices “move away” from exposure, large
traders should hide their trading intentions as the opportunity costs associated with paying high
prices at terminal time can be significant. On the other hand, exposure-rewarding markets
eliminate the opportunity risk associated with partial execution. Thus traders can expose their
trading intentions.
Proposition 2. Suppose that all functions depend sufficiently smoothly only order imbalances.
Then there is a (sufficiently large) order size Nd such that for any N > Nd the respective
19We call this regime “Absence of Market Impact”, since this form of market impact is not adversely affecting
the trader’s execution performance.
20Consistent with this, earlier research has found that parasitic traders are front-running large visible limit
orders and that prices may be adversely affected by the exposure decision; markets will penalize order exposure
at least to some extend; see, e.g. Harris (1996, 2003); Bessembinder et al. (2009).
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µ < 0 .
(2.20)






























































Next, observe that N ·W =
(
N − E[V ∆T ]
)
























(N − E[V ∆T ])µ(∆)
Now, if I is a smooth enough function of the display size and βr, β̂r and α are smooth functions
of order imbalances, this term is bounded. Hence, since I ′ > 0 and ∂
∂µ
W > 0 we see that for
large positions the sign of d
d∆W is determined by the sign of
∂µ
∂I
and hence the result follows.
According to (2.16), the market impact-term (MMarket) depends strongly on the sensitivity of
the imbalance with respect to the display sizes. This suggests, that adding/exposing only small
orders to already large volumes at the top-of-the-book, or already large imbalances, will not
alter the imbalance substantially. In this case, the trader suffers only minor exposure-impact
related impact, while she fully benefits from the gain in time-priority. Therefore, according the
next proposition, the trader is be better-off exposing her trading intentions.
Proposition 3 (Imbalance, Standing Liquidity and Optimal Display Size). (i) For large or
small enough (initial) depth Dask at the opposite side of the book, the optimal display size
obeys
∆∗ = N. (2.21)
(ii) Assume fixed initial depth Dbid at the same side. For sufficiently negative or positive
imbalances, the optimal display strategy obeys
∆∗ = N. (2.22)













Proof. In view of (2.14), we have I ′(∆) = Dask(Dbid+Dask+∆)2 . Hence it follows from (2.16) that the
market impact term vanishes and the priority term dominates for Dask → ∞ and Dask → 0.
This proves the first assertion. The second assertion follows because for a given bid side depth,
large imbalances occur if Dask → ±∞. As for the third assertion, let us assume that µI > 0;
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the other case follows by analogy. As in the proof of the previous proposition, we write the
expression in (2.16) as
d
d∆




















where we abbreviated the left term by M . In (*) we used the fact that all terms of M have a
common factor, namely e−
Dbid(1−C)
α . This can be easily seen by simply checking the respective
derivatives of W (2.2). Due to exponential decay for Dbid → ∞ the second term will dominate
for sufficiently large Dbid. Since
∂µ
∂I
> 0 one sees that ∂W
∂∆ > 0 for all 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ N and hence the
assertion follows.
Remark 4. The proof of (iii) hinges on the assumption, that the distribution of aggregate mar-
ket order arrival volumes has exponential decay, see (2.9). We have chosen the exponential form
out of convenience and analytical tractability. In general, one might expect the distribution to
be fat-tailed. The proof suggests, when the distribution decays weaker than 11+x2 , the conditions
for (iii) might be violated and in the limit Dbid → ∞ the time-priority-term might prevail. In
this case, we might obtain ∆∗ = N, irrespective of the monotonicity of µ with respect to I.
The previous proposition studied the asymptotic effect of the (initial) standing liquidity on
the trader’s optimal display choice. For fixed initial best bid depth (Dbid), we found that if
the best ask depth (Dask) is sufficiently high (high imbalance-skew), all contributions but the
time-priority contributions (MPriority) vanish. This is because adding additional liquidity to
an already highly skewed book contributes only marginally to the imbalance. The situation is
different for the best bid (Dbid). For large Dbid, instead of the priority-term, the price-impact
term dominates and the optimal exposure strategy depends on the direction of market impact.
The reason that the results for best bid and best ask depths is that our trader is a buyer.
Hence, the standing volume Dbid is important (it is the queue that needs to be filled before the
Iceberg order can get served) while Dask only affects the order imbalance.
We close this section with a brief comment on the dependence of display sizes on flow dynamics.
Proposition 4 (Liquidity Flow and Optimal Display Size). For sufficiently strong liquidity
competition, i.e. infI β̂r sufficiently large and
∂β̂r
∂I
→ 0 as well as for sufficiently weak liquidity












Proof. For infI β̂r → 1 and
∂β̂r
∂I































so the same arguments as before apply.
2.3.3 Execution volume
Besides execution costs, execution volume is a common benchmark for execution performance.
In this section we compare optimal expose strategies for volume and transaction-costs-traders.
A volume-trader maximizes the expected execution volume E[V ∆T ] while a transaction-cost




















> 0; the opposite case follows analogously. Let us assume to the contrary
that there exists maximizers ∆∗W > ∆
∗
V
. Then, by definition of W given in (2.2) and setting


























from which one gets that V(∆∗
V





The reason a volume-trader displays more is that opportunity costs associated with unfilled
orders are nor important to her. She solely looks at maximizing the total execution volume at
the submission price level, in-effect ignoring that she might have to pay an additional premium
in order to finish the trade.
2.3.4 Concluding remarks
Our analytical results are in line with the empirical findings in Bessembinder, Panayides, and
Venkatamaran (2009), especially their cross-sectional regression analysis21. The findings of
21Their empirical results on trader’s exposure strategies, reveals that the decision to expose as well as the
exposure-magnitude strongly depend on the prevailing order book state, order arrival activity and order at-
tributes. In particular, they report significant t-statistics for the order size (27.64), same-side (-3.70) and
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Propositions 2, 3 and 4) indicate that - ceteris paribus - traders hide more when the order size
is large, the best bid depth is large, the market order volume is low and the limit order flow
competition is strong for “away-drifting markets”. Proposition 5 is in line with another main
result of Bessembinder et al. (2009), namely the fact that exposure shortens time-to-completion,
amounting to higher execution volume for fixed trading horizon, while hiding generally reduces
transaction costs. This is exactly what Proposition 5 predicts if ∂µ
∂I
> 0. The fact that our
model shows strong consistency with the empirical findings of Bessembinder et al. (2009) for
“away-drifting markets” suggests that realistically ∂µ
∂I
> 0. In the sequel, we provide strong
empirical evidence that this is indeed the case.
3 Model Calibration
Our model hinges upon the assumption, that order flows and prices are affected by the trader’s
exposure decision through its impact on order imbalances. In order to calibrate the model we
thus need to estimate the functions
I → qI , q̂I , pI , βI , β̂I , αI , rI , γI , µI . (3.1)
This amounts to estimating the impact of openly displayed limit orders. In the theoretical
and empirical literature so far, market impact considerations have been mainly undertaken
with respect to market orders ; cf. the literature on optimal liquidation (Almgren and Chriss
(1999); Obizhaeva andWang (2005); Alfonsi et al. (2010); Alfonsi and Schied (2010) and others).
Market impact of passive (limit, Iceberg) orders is different from the market impact of aggressive
(market) orders. Aggressive orders are executed against standing liquidity and hence incur an
instantaneous price impact. By contrast, passive orders incur execution-risk, the latter being
essentially governed by order flow. This suggests that impact of a (displayed) limit order
should be captured through its impact on future orders. Consistent with Harris (1996, 1997),
our estimates of the model parameters (3.1) indicate that market impact of exposure is largely
due to the presence of parasitic traders. We find only weak evidence that exposure impact is
caused by impatient trader’s retreating from the market as reported in Moinas (2010).
Our estimates of the flow parameters are used to estimate transaction costs and optimal display
strategies. In the sequel we provide optimal display strategies for selected stocks from the US
S&P-500-index and benchmark the performance of Iceberg Orders against that of plain limit
orders. Our results suggest that Iceberg Orders may help to significantly lower transaction
costs.
opposite-side (-3.40) depth, same-side hidden depth (3.84), order book imbalance (-3.72), waiting time (2.03)
and trade size (-5.16). These results indicate - ceteris paribus - that traders hide more when the order size is
large, the quoted liquidity depth is small, the book-imbalance is skewed towards the opposite side of the market
and the market order volume is high and the liquidity competition is strong. Similar empirical results have been
reported by De Winne and D’Hondt (2007)
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3.1 The Data Set
Our estimates are based onMessage Level data from the Instinet (INET)22 market for the period
of January and February 2009. This data-set provides messages for every order entry, including
modification, cancelation, submission and execution. The messages contain order identification
number, time stamps, modification/submission/cancelation/execution size, as well as a flag
marking the side of the book (buy or sell). This way, we were able to track every order until
cancellation/execution and to re-construct the visible order book.
In order to estimate the dependence of the model parameters on imbalances we used a sample
of non-intersecting ∆t-periods during 9:30 and 15:30 hrs for which - for each realization of
the initial imbalance I- we record the cumulative flow volumes (xI , ŷI , yI), standing hidden
volume (hI) as well as the effective spread at the respective terminal time, and constructed the
Maximum-Likelihood-estimates (MLE) for the corresponding flow (qI , q̂I , pI , βI , β̂I , αI ) and
price (µI) parameters.
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The INET-data set does not send messages for modification and cancelation of hidden orders
which renders the reconstruction of the hidden volume hI at a given price level incomplete. In
order to obtain proper estimates for the hidden parameters (rI , γI ), we use NASDAQ-Model-
View-data instead.24 At each price level, this data set provides full minute-by-minute snapshots
of the market’s consolidated visible and hidden depth for NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX-listed
stocks. This includes the following selection of liquid, high-tech S&P500-stocks from the INET-
exchange: 25 Cisco Systems Inc. (CSCO), Dell Inc. (DELL), eBay Inc. (EBAY), Hewlett-
Packard Company (HPQ), Microsoft Corp. (MSFT) and Oracle Corp. (ORCL).
3.2 Parameter Estimation and Market Impact of Limit Orders
For the estimation we assume a discretization of the imbalance interval of 0.15 points in a
range between -0.7 and 0.7.26 For each realization of I, we construct the respective Maximum
Likelihood Estimates (MLE) for the model parameters qI , q̂I , pI , βI , β̂I , αI , rI , γI , µI , see (B.5).
In order to obtain smooth functional representations, additionally we apply a cubic weighted
Ordinary Least Squares (wOLS)27 on the point estimates. We use weighted OLS in order to
properly account for possible heteroscedacity-effects.28 For ∆t = 30s, examples of estimated
22INET was one of the largest and first recognized electronic communications network (ECN) in the US,
starting its first electronic trading venue in 1969. It was bought by NASDAQ in 2005. As of the last quarter of
2008 INET holds 5% share of the total US market in traded equity volume.
23We note the reader, that we use the same notation for the “true” parameter values and the empirical
MLE-estimates, as we supposed to be clear from the context what we mean.
24We acknowledge that we simply assume that the NASDAQ data is a good proxy for hidden liquidity at
INET.
25We only consider trading activity as recorded on the INET stock exchange. Note however, that these stocks
are traded simultaneously on multiple venues as the US equities market is fragmented and there is no centralized
trading platform.
26Samples beyond this imbalance range are sparse and thus don’t gather sufficient statistics.
27Cubic polynomials are the first choice for model/regression functions that are nonlinear and at the same
time account for possible asymmetric relationships.
28Note that extremely large positive or negative imbalances I may occur less frequently than smaller ones,
since in general they afford more liquidity . Thus the sample sizes and thereby the sample variances may vary
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conditional probabilities (qI , q̂I , pI ) and conditional mean volumes (βI , β̂I , αI ) along with the
corresponding wOLS-fits are shown in Figure 1 for ORCL and CSCO. Notice, by definition
expected flow volumes obey


























































Figure 1: Example of Flow Parameter Estimation for Oracle and Cisco as a function of imbalance for
∆t = 30s. Observe that the “front-running” limit order flow ŷ shows strong dependence on the order
books imbalance. The dependence of market order flow and limit order flow at the submission price
level is comparably marginal.
They are shown in Figure 2 from which we observe that the (total) liquidity supply ahead
the submission price level reacts most strongly to changes in the imbalance I: expected flow
volumes for ORCL (CSCO) increases from just below 4,000 (5,000) shares for sufficiently large
imbalances on the opposite side of the book -(I < 0)- to more than 15,000 (25,000) shares for
sufficiently large same-side liquidity-excess - (I > 0), an increase by a factor of more than 3.75
(5.0). Figure 1 suggests that the significant increase in flow volume is mainly due to the increase
in the arrival probabilities q̂I by a factor 3.0 (3.5): for large enough opposite-side-imbalances
(I ≪ 0), the probability of “front-running”-flow lies below the 15% (20%) level, while in the
opposite case (I ≫ 0), the probability may reach percentages beyond the 50% (65%) level. We
observe comparably weaker dependence of conditional mean order sizes (limit ahead and at the






































Figure 2: Expected aggregate conditional order flow volume.
Besides the order flow dynamics at the same side of the market, the best ask price AT at the




































Figure 3: Price Impact of the Order Book Imbalance I for Oracle and Cisco for ∆t = 30s. The expected
conditional price best ask price E [AT | I ] (in bps) against the (initial) relative imbalance I . Note, that







the flow properties, we thus estimated its (conditional) mean values E[AT | I]. In Figure 3, we
provide the estimate results for CSCO and ORCL for the case of ∆t = 30s. We observe, that
the stronger the (initial) order book imbalance the stronger the price change in the direction of
the imbalance-excess. The expected 30-seconds future price change for CSCO (ORCL) equals
about 4 (2) basis points for relative imbalances beyond 0.5. As the average spread for this
stock lies at about 6 (5)29, we can conclude that the price increment is significant. We report
asymmetry in that the imbalance-impact on the price is not totally symmetric with respect to
the origin: For zero imbalance, one still expects a positive price drift, nevertheless still within
the range of the stock’s average spread. Moreover, in terms of basis points price change for
positive imbalances - bid-side excess - is more pronounced than for negative imbalances. While
as for Cisco, we observed an expected price change of about 3 (1.7) basis point for I = 0.5, the
price change for the negative imbalance of I = −0.5 is about -1 basis points (for both). Figures
4 and 5 in the appendix provide additional flow and price estimates for the stocks of Apple,
Amazon, Ebay, Hewlett-Packard, Dell and Microsoft and for the periods ∆t = 3s, 10s, 30s.
3.3 Correlation Analysis
Table 2 shows estimated correlations between the (initial) imbalance and the conditional ex-
pected order flows and price increments. We observe, that apart from some market order flow,
the null hypothesizes that the imbalance and the respective conditional expectations of flow
volumes and the price increments are independent can be rejected at the 0.001 level of sig-
nificance in most cases. The correlation estimates indicate, that the best ask price and the
front-running flow ( ŷ) react most strongly to changes in the imbalance; we report throughout
significant correlation estimates.30 For stocks like Apple (AAPL) and Amazon (AMZN) that on
average trade at larger spreads our estimates indicate less imbalance-related correlation with
market’s future flow and price. The substantial positive correlation for E [ŷI ] suggests that
29See table 1 for details.
30The correlation estimates are throughout double-digit in the case of 1-tick spread stocks
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imbalance on the trader’s side triggers “front-running” (bid) limit order flow. Indeed, we see
from Figure 4 that for ∆t = 3s and for sufficiently large imbalances on the opposite (same) side
of the book, the expected liquidity supply flow ahead the submission price level can increase to
more than 400% (drop down to below than 40%) as compared to the volume in the balanced
case, i.e. for I ≈ 0. This finding confirms Harris’ parasitic trader -scenario of exposure-impact:
Exposure causes these traders to undercut the limit order and post at more aggressive prices
and is consistent with the empirical literature on order aggressiveness.31 On the other hand, we
only find weak indication for the alternative scenario: Exposure (imbalance-skew) causes pas-
sive traders to retreat from the market, as we don’t observe significant variations in the market
order flow with changes in the imbalance; however, this effect might somewhat be still signifi-
cant in the case of large opposite-side imbalance-excess, as for some stocks Figure 4 reports a
drop in flow volume from opposite-side excess (negative imbalance) to same-side-excess (posi-
tive imbalance). Finally, the correlation estimates indicate that generally prices move against
the trader the larger the imbalance on the trader’s side, increasing the trader’s “opportunity”
costs.32
Let us conclude this section with a brief discussion of the temporal structure of the correlation
analysis, starting first for stocks that trade 1-tick spreads (Table 2). Except for Dell (DELL)
and Ebay (EBAY), we observe a decay in market impact over time. The “font-running” flow
ŷ and price AT correlations tend to decrease with time. For example, for Cisco (CSCO) the
price correlation drops from 0.23 for a 3s-period to 0.12 for a 30s-period. For Hewlett-Packard
(HPQ) it drops from 0.19 to 0.06. Generally, flow show less decay in time than price corre-
lations. While both Dell and Ebay show correlation peaks for the “front-running” order flow
at 10s-periods, only Dell shows a correlation peak for the price process for the same period.
However price-correlations for Ebay between the 3s- and the 10s- period differ only marginally.
A possible explanation for the correlation peak at mid-time periods for Ebay and Dell is that
they trade slower and thus need longer to generate a reaction to changes in the order book (i.e.
imbalance) than more actively traded stocks; see also Table 3 where we reported probabilities of
order arrivals for different time periods, indicating how actively the stocks are traded. Among
all stocks considered, Ebay and Dell exhibit the smallest event-probability over all time peri-
ods, indicating that these stocks are less actively traded than the others. We obtain a similar
behavior for the stocks with wider spreads. While for Apple the correlations decay for both
small (one tick) (a) and large (two ticks) spreads (b), Amazon shows a significant correlation
peak at the ∆t = 10s period for small spreads. Again, applying the same reasoning, Table 3
suggests that Amazon is less actively traded than Apple. These findings are consistent with
the empirical literature surrounding the issue of information content of the limit order book,
where the order-book-state’s impact on the evolution of future market behavior is studied, see
Hellström and Simonsen (2006); Pascual Gasco and Veredas (2008); Cao et al. (2009); Chordia
et al. (2002); Huang and Stoll (1994). Moreover, since the imbalance is a function of the openly
displayed part of (limit) orders, our empirical findings as well add to the research surrounding
31We refer to Ranaldo (2004); Bessembinder et al. (2009); Griffiths et al. (2000); Biais et al. (1995); Chor-
dia et al. (2002); Beber and Caglio (2005); note that “front-running” flow is equivalent to “aggressive” order
placement.
32Note that the trader has to complete the unexecuted Iceberg order against the best (relative) ask price AT
according to the model setup. Thus the more the price moves away, the larger the transaction costs W . Costs
that are related to partial executions are often referred to as “opportunity costs”.
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the market impact of limit orders.33 Namely, order exposure trigger’s price-improving and com-
peting limit order flow on the same side of the book and (on average) causes the best quoted
prices to move away from the trader’s position.
3.4 Optimal Exposure Strategies: Calibration Results
Our estimation results allow us to compute the optimal exposure decision (∆∗) and to study
the dependence of ∆∗ on the model parameters within our theoretical model. In order to
compare the display decisions for different order sizes and stocks, we introduce the optimal
display ratio ∆∗r :=
∆∗
N
. Figures 6 and 7 show the results for the case ∆t = 10s. The optimal
display ratios are drawn with respect to the initial buy-side depth (Dbid) and imbalance (I0).
Optimal exposure strategies close to 1 (i.e. full exposure) are colored red; exposure strategies
close to 0 (i.e. zero exposure), they are colored blue.34 According to our data sampling, initial
imbalances (I0) range between −0.7 and 0.7. The initial same-side depth (Dbid) ranges have
been chosen so as to include typical average best bid depths for the respective stocks; see Table
1 in the Appendix. For order sizes (N), we have chosen three values for each stock: a small, an
intermediate and a large one.
Throughout the range of stocks, we observe that for small order sizes (left-hand-side of Figure
6 and 7), the optimal exposure strategy is generally full display (i.e. ∆∗r = 1 for most values of
Dbid and I0). Exceptions for some stocks occur for large initial same-side depth (Dbid), as in the
case of Cisco, Dell, Ebay and Oracle. However, as our markets obey ∂µ
∂I
> 035, this is consistent
with Proposition 3. For intermediate order sizes the optimal display ratio ∆∗r has decreased
significantly across the parameter range, as for most pairs of (Dbid,I0) we have ∆
∗
r ≪ 1. For
Amazon, Cisco, Dell, Ebay and Oracle the optimal display ratio can still be significantly above
zero for sufficient opposite-side (i.e. negative), initial imbalance and not too large same-side
depth. Apart from Apple and Hewlett-Packard, we observe that generally negative initial
imbalances (i.e. opposite-side liquidity excess) lead to higher exposure. This suggests, that
increasing already-skewed imbalances on the same side by exposing further shares is generally
sub-optimal. On the other hand, when the imbalance is skewed towards the opposite side, then
exposure seems be a proper decision.36 For large order sizes (right-hand side of figure 6 and 7)
the optimal strategy is zero exposure (“hiding the order”). Again taking into account that our
markets obey ∂µ
∂I
> 0, this is in line with Proposition 2.
Having estimated the price and flow parameters and how they relate to the imbalance, we
find that our model confirms many naive expectations. Namely, for larger Iceberg Orders
the trader ideally reduces her display ratio, since large orders (if displayed) generally incur
large adverse market movements. More precisely and in the sense of market impact elaborated
upon in previous sections, for a buy trader, large positive imbalances cause the flows to react
adversely, i.e. competing limit order flows increase on the same side and thus increases traders’
execution risk. In addition, the expected best ask price process does also moves away, increasing
33Previously, Hautsch and Huang have studied the impact of single limit orders on the spot price only Hautsch
and Huang (2009).
34Optimal exposure strategies for intermediate exposures are colored using a specific rainbow-color-gradient.
35See Figure 5.
36These statements have to be taken with great caution, since this is not an extensive cross-sectional study.
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opportunity risk. Hence large imbalances incur market impact in two ways. First they reduce
the chance of getting executed by increased liquidity competition on the same-side market and
secondly the trader is forced to pay a higher premium for the unexecuted part of the Iceberg
order. On the other hand, small orders, since they do not substantially change the imbalance
of the book, don’t incur substantial market impact. Hence our trader can fully benefit from
priority-gain when exposing the whole order. For intermediate-sized orders, depending on the
current order book state as well as the order size and the trading interval, there is an optimal
display ratio. These observations are in total accordance with the expectation that large orders
cause high market impact and thus justify the need for hiding trading intentions, while small
orders can bee freely disclosed to the market. At the same time, we find that a trader should
display more the larger the observable depth at the same side Dbid that sits ahead of him with
higher priority-to-execution. Again, we argue that in the case of large queue sizes the additional
display of the iceberg order does only have a limited effect on the relative imbalance and thus
does not cause much market impact. These results are broadly consistent with the empirical
analysis on traders “real” order exposure strategies as reported in Bessembinder et al. (2009).
However, as our analysis is conditioned on the (initial) state of the book and thus is more
refined as compared to their cross-sectional regression study. According to our model, we find
that the optimal exposure strategy is not always consistent with what traders do in general as
indicated by their work. Namely, depending on the state of the book and the stock and the
time horizon considered, traders should not expose their trade intentions when they observe
larger depth or imbalances at the same side.
3.5 The Performance Test: Iceberg versus Limit Orders
Besides knowing optimal exposure strategies, in this final sequel, we address the question to
what degree the usage of an Iceberg order may improve the trading process as compared to
using plain limit orders. This question is highly relevant for market participants and investors.
Let Wice := min
0≤∆≤N
W (∆) denote the (optimal) Iceberg and Wlim := W (N) the corresponding






The smaller σ, the better-off the trader is using an Iceberg Order; for σ close to zero she may
as well use plain limit orders. Moreover, it is of interest to know under what market-conditions
the usage of Iceberg orders is generally preferred.
The performance for Apple, Amazon, Cisco, Dell, Ebay, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft and Oracle
for ∆t = 10s and spreads equaling one cent are shown in the Figures 8 and 9 (see appendix).
Figure 8, shows σ as a function of the (initial) depth Dbid and the book-imbalance I0; Figure
9 plots the performance depending on order sizes N and imbalances I0. Green-blue-colored
(red-colored) faces represent regions, where Iceberg’s do (not) provide additional cost-savings
as compared to plain limit orders. We see that - ceteris paribus - the usage of Iceberg Orders
is beneficial, when the (initial) imbalance on the trader’s side the order size is large. Our
interpretation is as follows. Since small orders don’t significantly alter the state of the book,
such orders won’t incur much market impact and thus the cost-savings generated by hiding
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shares via Iceberg orders is limited.37 For large orders however, since the potential to cause
large exposure impact, the cost-savings can be highly significant. Indeed according to Figure
9, we find throughout all stocks that for a sufficiently large order sizes the performance gain
with Icebergs over plain limit orders can reach up to 60%. This result is consistent with earlier
empirical results, that Iceberg Orders are prevalently used by large traders.38 For both figures
we observe that an Iceberg Order can boost trading performance particularly when imbalance-
excess is massively on the trader’s side. For instance, consider the Dell-stock in Figure 8. While
in the case of strong opposite-side imbalance excess, the performance-gain in using Icebergs is
at most 10%, the latter can reach up to 50% for sufficiently strong same-side imbalance-excess
(I > 0.5). This feature is roughly stable among all stocks in the Figures 9 and 8. We observe
that the Iceberg performance σ seems to be broadly independent of the (initial) same-side depth
Dbid.
In conclusion, depending on the trading regime (order size and order book state), the optimal
display decision can significantly improve trading performance. The results indicate that when
the order size is large and the (initial) imbalance is skewed towards the trader’s side of the
book, the trader can significantly enhance execution when using Icebergs. In these situations,
we report performance gains of up to 60% as compared to the benchmark limit order case.
We also report “regimes” where the usage of Iceberg order can be roughly considered obsolete,
particularly for large opposite-side imbalance-excess and small order sizes.
4 Conclusion
We proposed a simple model of optimal portfolio liquidation using Iceberg-Orders for risk-
neutral traders seeking to minimize transaction costs. Market dynamics are driven by sequen-
tial, (aggregated) order submissions and cancelations at the trader’s side and a conditionally
independent price process for the opposite side of the market. The key assumption is that
the state of the orderbook, especially the volume imbalance at the top of the book, affects
the market. As a consequence, by choosing the display size, the trader can control how much
exposure impact she is willing to generate. Exposure impact, that is, market impact of exposed
limit orders, materializes in three important ways: via market and limit order flow and quoted
prices. Our empirical analysis suggests that exposure impact is mainly governed by the impact
of displayed orders on the limit order flow and the quoted best opposite price, while market
order flow shows only weak sensibility towards exposure. In particular, consistent with Harris’
parasitic trader -scenario, we find that exposure causes higher limit order competition at and
ahead the trader’s submission price level, while prices (on average) move away from the side of
exposure. Less pronounced, we observe that exposure causes reduced market order flow volume
as impatient trader’s retreat from the market as predicted by Moinas (2010). These findings
indicate that markets systematically penalize order disclosure. At the same time, there is a
loss in time priority associated with non-disclosure of orders. The trader thus faces a trade-off
between a loss in time-priority and a reduced market impact when shielding his trading in-
37But this does not necessarily imply that sufficiently small orders should be fully disposed as can be seen
from figure 9. Still, in order to trade optimally, one might need to even (partially) hide small orders.
38See Bessembinder et al. (2009); Harris (1996); Frey and Sandas (2009); D’Hondt et al. (2004); Aitken et al.
(2001); De Winne and D’Hondt (2007).
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tentions from public view. Based on an analytical analysis we find that its is optimal to hide
more when the order is large, depths at the top of the book is small, imbalance-excess is on the
same-side of the book, liquidity consumption rates (i.e. market order volumes) are high and
liquidity competition (i.e. limit order flow in the same side) is low, a behavioral pattern had
been documented earlier by Bessembinder et al. (2009).This also implies that traders indeed
make sensible (“optimal”) decisions with regard to exposure. Consistent with their finding,
that exposure amounts to higher execution volume, while hiding generally reduces transaction
costs, we show that when markets penalize exposure traders who try to maximize execution
volume expose more than traders who try to minimize execution costs. This is due to the fact,
that in contrast to “execution-cost-traders”, “volume-traders” systematically under-estimates
“opportunity” costs.
In demonstrating how the model can be applied to address low-time-scales execution problems
in electronic limit order books, we calibrate the model and provide optimal exposure profiles for
a range of high-tech stocks with respect to the (initial) state-of-the book. The sample calibra-
tion results show that throughout the selected stock-range and the parameter space, exposure
ratio decreases with order size, i.e. the trader is supposed to display smaller fractions of the
total order when the corresponding size is large. For sufficiently small order sizes, irrespective
of the market conditions and the state of the book, the trader can generally expose his full
trade intentions as exposure-impact is negligible. For intermediate order sizes, one observe that
exposure may only be a sensible decisions for a certain sub-spaces in the order book state space,
namely for opposite-side imbalances and small initial bid depths Dbid.
39 For sufficiently large
order sizes, the optimal strategy is to hide the full order. Finally we benchmark the Iceberg
performance against the plain limit order. We find that the improvement in execution perfor-
mance can be highly substantial, reaching up to 60% percent as compared to the limit order.
In general, Icebergs enhance trade performance when the (initial) imbalance I0 is sufficiently
skewed towards the trader’s side and the traders order size is large. Empirical literature has
reported that hidden liquidity is used much less for liquid stocks.40 However, the benchmark
test for liquid stocks like Cisco or Microsoft shows that under certain order book conditions
execution performance-gain with Icebergs can be significant. The order book size and the im-
balance play an important role in this context.
Our findings have important implications for investors and traders as we add further theoretical
analysis and guidance to the question how to optimally use hidden orders in limit order book
markets and how states of the order-book affect these decisions. This is in particular relevant
for low-time scales or high-frequency trading as for (liquid) stocks, orders with typical order
sizes are filled at second’s or minute’s time. Venue-owners and regulators on the other hand
have an interest to understand the motifs on using hidden liquidity in order to fine-tune the
optimal degree of market opacity or pre-trade transparency.
A Stock-Properties
39Exceptions are reported.
























AAPL 3 88.81 1.92 2.16 505 640 863 401 239 311 0.53 4.12
10 88.8 1.92 2.17 501 1952 2024 1174 778 509 0.61 1.23
30 88.8 1.93 2.17 499 5572 5573 3233 2339 803 0.65 0.15
AMZN 3 53.3 2.91 5.46 324 215 494 153 62 138 0.40 4.03
10 53.3 2.92 5.48 322 611 805 481 130 233 0.54 2.31
30 53.3 2.93 5.50 324 1730 1784 1336 394 374 0.61 0.77
CSCO 3 16.68 1.02 6.13 19776 932 2860 242 690 3753 0.18 128.43
10 16.68 1.03 6.16 19741 2708 4287 2391 317 7267 0.34 89.29
30 16.68 1.03 6.16 19686 7764 8548 7700 64 12118 0.50 48.35
DELL 3 10.54 1.05 9.93 8520 600 2617 63 537 1185 0.12 79.76
10 10.54 1.05 9.96 8498 1477 3098 651 826 2377 0.23 63.10
30 10.54 1.05 9.98 8480 3682 4835 2219 1463 4234 0.39 51.70
EBAY 3 14.32 1.03 7.21 5904 234 925 28 206 1070 0.16 47.96
10 14.31 1.04 7.25 5824 643 1192 440 203 2016 0.32 33.55
30 14.31 1.04 7.28 5840 1746 1957 1713 33 3783 0.52 20.64
HPQ 3 36.33 1.27 3.49 945 181 500 150 31 422 0.45 5.14
10 36.33 1.27 3.50 942 501 756 388 113 641 0.62 3.89
30 36.33 1.27 3.51 942 1433 1557 951 482 904 0.72 2.00
MSFT 3 19.99 1.03 5.15 22213 956 2902 519 437 3632 0.17 122.58
10 19.99 1.03 5.17 22216 2716 4338 3141 −425 6904 0.31 89.82
30 19.98 1.04 5.18 22140 7470 8309 9346 −1876 11819 0.48 46.69
ORCL 3 18.09 1.03 5.69 13022 887 2834 173 714 2452 0.17 76.63
10 18.09 1.03 5.70 12938 2479 4255 1477 1002 4909 0.32 53.13
30 18.09 1.03 5.71 12920 6680 7659 5198 1482 8907 0.50 28.82
Table 1: Average Stock Properties for all periods of 3s, 10s and 30s. The table represents unconditional expectation values
for price (mid-point price) the spread (ticks as well as in basis-points relative to the actual quoted mid-point-price), the
best bid depth or top-of-the-book (Dbid), the period’s total buy-side trade volume (E[x]), the “trade size” (E[x|x > 0]),
the limit order flow volume “ahead” submission-price-level (E[ŷ]), the net-flow volume “ahead” submission-price level
(E[x− ŷ]), the limit order flow volume “at” submission-price level (E[y]), the top-of-book cancellation ratio (C) and finally




∆t = 3s ∆t = 10s ∆t = 30s
E [yI ] E [ŷI ] E [xI ] µI E [yI ] E [ŷI ] E [xI ] µI E [yI ] E [ŷI ] E [xI ] µI
AAPL(a) −0.05∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.06∗∗ 0− 0.06∗∗ 0− 0.04∗∗
AAPL(b) 0.02∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗
AMZN(a) 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0− 0.11∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.03∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.07∗∗
AMZN(b) 0.06∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0− 0.1∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.02∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.07∗∗
CSCO −0.07∗∗ 0.12∗∗ −0.06∗∗ 0.23∗∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.12∗∗ −0.05∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.07∗∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.12∗∗
DELL 0.01∗ 0.16∗∗ 0− 0.15∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0− 0.17∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.01− 0.14∗∗
EBAY 0.01− 0.16∗∗ −0.07∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.07∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.15∗∗ −0.07∗∗ 0.17∗∗
HPQ 0.02∗∗ 0.12∗∗ −0.03∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0− 0.13∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.06∗∗
MSFT −0.12∗∗ 0.1∗∗ −0.07∗∗ 0.22∗∗ −0.06∗∗ 0.1∗∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.12∗∗
ORCL −0.08∗∗ 0.13∗∗ −0.1∗∗ 0.21∗∗ −0.07∗∗ 0.12∗∗ −0.08∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.05∗∗ 0.12∗∗
Table 2: Correlation between stocks (initial) imbalance I 0! and the conditional flow volume and price expectations for the time periods ∆t = 3s, 10s, 30s. Since
Apple and Amazon are stocks that on average trade at wider spreads, we provide two estimates, one representing small spread scenarios (.25-quintile) and the
other representing large ones (.75-quintile). For Cisco, Dell, Ebay, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft and Oracle we only provide one estimate, since they basically trade
at one-tick spreads, see (). Results indicate how significantly the (initial) imbalance affects future expected order flow volumes as well as expected price. The
0.001, 0.01, and 0.1 level of significance are denoted by (∗∗),(∗) and (−) respectively.
2
7
Stock ∆t (in s) 1− q 1− q̂ 1− p 1− r
AAPL
3 0.12 0.44 0.26 0.47
10 0.05 0.24 0.04 0.47
30 0.03 0.14 0 0.47
AMZN
3 0.35 0.57 0.57 0.46
10 0.15 0.33 0.24 0.46
30 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.46
CSCO
3 0.09 0.97 0.67 0.43
10 0.02 0.87 0.37 0.43
30 0.02 0.71 0.09 0.43
DELL
3 0.19 0.98 0.77 0.34
10 0.04 0.89 0.52 0.34
30 0.01 0.72 0.24 0.34
EBAY
3 0.23 0.98 0.75 0.49
10 0.05 0.9 0.46 0.49
30 0.02 0.73 0.11 0.49
HPQ
3 0.18 0.79 0.64 0.68
10 0.06 0.61 0.34 0.68
30 0.03 0.43 0.08 0.68
MSFT
3 0.11 0.96 0.67 0.43
10 0.02 0.85 0.37 0.43
30 0.01 0.67 0.1 0.43
ORCL
3 0.12 0.97 0.69 0.49
10 0.02 0.88 0.42 0.49
30 0.01 0.72 0.13 0.49
Table 3: Unconditional empirical estimates for the probability that no order arrives in the case of the
limit order flows ŷ and y, market order flow x and the probability that at arrival-time there, is no
hidden liquidity (h > 0) at submission-price-level (1 − r). Estimates for the flow probabilities have
been undertaken for the periods of 3s, 10s and 30s. Due to the nature of the NASDAQ data set, for
the “hidden probabilities” we have only one timely-unconditioned estimate. Observe that the chances
that no orders arrive decreases with the period length.
B Estimation-Methodology
The MLE-estimates are constructed as follows. For each realization of the imbalance I, we
denote n the number of samples of time-length ∆t and xi, yi, ŷi, hi, ai the aggregated market
and limit order volumes, hidden liquidity volume and (relative) price increment of the i’th
sample, respectively. Then, the canonical choice for the MLE-estimates of the parameters




























































































































































I E[y| I ]
E[x| I ]
∆t = 30s
Figure 4: Order Flow Impact of Order Book Imbalance I . Absolute expected order flow volume -for
the three flow types x, ŷ, y- as multiple of its expected magnitudes when the order book is initially
balanced I = 0, i.e. E[x| I ] := E[xI ]
E[ ŷ|I=0]
and analog for ŷ and y. Order flow reacts stronger on shorter
time horizons than on longer. Moreover, the liquidity supplying and price improving ŷflow reacts most














































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Iceberg’s Optimal Display Strategy (∆∗r) for Apple, Amazon, Cisco and Dell are shown for
the case ∆t = 10s and the spread equaling one cent. (Cumulative) Order sizes are given in shares. The
optimal display ratio is computed against the initial order book imbalance (I0) and the initial best-bid
depth (Dbid). The left column represents small-order-size situations, mid-columns represents mid-size



















































































































































































































Figure 7: Iceberg’s Optimal Display Strategy (∆∗r) for Ebay, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft and Oracle
are shown for the case ∆t = 10s and the spread equaling one cent. (Cumulative) Order sizes are given
in shares. The optimal display ratio is computed against the initial order book imbalance (I0) and
the initial best-bid depth (Dbid). The left column represents small-order-size situations, mid-columns



































































































































































































Figure 8: Regions of Iceberg-Performance-Boost σ. We fixed the Icebergs trading horizon (∆t = 30s), side-of-trade (buy), spread (1 cent), as well as its overall
size in shares(N). For realized (initial) order book imbalance Iand queue size Dbid in shares, we display the Iceberg orders potential trade improvement σ.





































































































































































































Figure 9: Regions of Iceberg-Performance-Boost σ. We fixed the Icebergs trading horizon (∆t = 30s), trade size (buy), spread (1 tick), as well as the best bid
depth D (for shorter notation we have written Db instead of Dbid). For realized (initial) order book imbalance (I0) and Icebergs order size (N) we display the
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